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Abstract 
 
Education plays an important role in the economic and social development of countries. Myriad 
studies show that education is one of the best ways to offer increased socio-economic 
opportunities, social mobility and wages. Not only is universal education important but more 
significant is the quality of the education. Traditionally, educational policy looks to increase 
resources, a practice that has not empirically demonstrated satisfactory results. When addressing 
the problem from an economic standpoint, scholars consider why some schools are "better" than 
others and examine whether school administration influences results. In 1962, Milton Friedman 
introduced the voucher system into public education.  Vouchers are simply the introduction of 
incentives as market forces, creating competition to improve educational results.  In other words, 
introducing these incentives creates competition in student recruitment, directly influenced by the 
academic results of the school – ideally allowing only those institutions with good results to survive 
“in the market” and closing those schools that cannot "compete" against higher-quality 
establishments. Unfortunately, sufficient data do not exist to endorse the assertion that vouchers 
yet impact “the market” in this form. However, I will use the empirical evidence that the Chilean 
case provides and try to determine if this voucher system works as the theory claims. This study 
will help to interpret this system, the operation of free choice and how the market forces act to 
increase the quality of education. Three types of variables exist and are used to explain the 
educational results of each student; they are the individual and family characteristics as well as the 
characteristics of the educational establishment. Many variables previously mentioned are 
endogenous. One of the most important variables for this analysis is the selection of the school, 
and therefore the traditional mechanism of ordinary least square (OLS) will bias the results. 
However, by predicting the probabilities of selecting a particular educational establishment, using 
instrumental variables, and then estimating a two stage least-square model, the bias problem will 
disappear. The article will be organized in the following way: Section I: Introduction, section II will 
describe the Chilean education system.  Section III describes the dataset and the methodology will 
be explained. Section IV describes the data and results and later on finally, section V contains the 
conclusion and recommendations. 
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I. Introduction 
Increasing economic resources for schools is the most commonly implemented 
approach to improving educational outcomes. However, studies have shown that this 
strategy does not always work efficiently. For instance, a meta-analysis by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) of over 400 student achievement studies concludes that there 
is no consistent evidence supporting the direct relationship between increasing resources 
and enhancing student performance.1 Other studies have analyzed discrepancies in school 
outcomes by focusing on how different approaches to school administration and financing 
influence results.  
In 1962, Milton Friedman proposed subsidizing the cost of education by issuing 
vouchers.2 His framework was designed to introduce market-based competition to increase 
educational quality among schools. The lack of conclusive support for this theory 
necessitates an evaluation of the Chilean voucher system that provides policymakers with 
evidence on the level of success or failure of the system. This study aims to contribute to 
the understanding of the voucher system and education policy in Chile.  
Contreras (2001) and Contreras, Arzola and Bronfman (2001) use standardized 
tests, specifically the Sistema de Medición de la Calidad de la Educación (SIMCE)3 dataset 
for the year 1999, as a proxy of achievement and school quality to establish whether or not 
the Chilean voucher system delivers better educational results than the public schools. This 
article applies their methodology to the latest available SIMCE dataset (2003) for second-
year high school students. This paper’s contribution lies in its analysis of empiric evidence 
from Chilean schools at the national level to further explore how free choice and market 
forces facilitate better outcomes and a higher quality of education. 
Information about the student, his or her family, and the school’s characteristics 
from the SIMCE dataset was used to develop variables for an analysis of individual results 
on the Language & Communication and Math tests. The model used is based on the 
equation below: 
Yi = β0X0 +β1 X1 + β2X2 + ε i 
                                                
1 (Hanushek 1986) 
2  (Friedman 1962) 
3 Sistema de medición de la calidad de la educación, Measurement System of  education quality . 
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Yi is the individual test score for each of the tests. X0 corresponds to individual 
characteristics, and X1 to family characteristics. X2 represents school information. βn are 
the associated parameters and εi is the error term.  
When using ordinary least-square (OLS) regressions, a number of problems 
typically arise. Some issues involve the estimation of the parameters. In other cases, 
important variables are omitted and some included variables are endogenous, or have 
values determined by the states of other variables in the system. One of the most critical of 
these variables is school choice. First, I will estimate an OLS model and then a two-stages 
least-squares (TSLS) model. In the TSLS model, I will predict the probability of enrolling 
in a public, private subsidized or private-paid school, based on availability at a community 
level, then include predicted probability into the first model to address selection bias. 
The TSLS model used by Contreras (2001) and later Contreras, Arzola and 
Bronfman (2001) deals effectively with the problem of endogenous variables. This method 
is groundbreaking because it addresses selection bias by using instrumental variables to 
predict a probability of attending each of the different school types. By using instrumental 
variables and a predicted probability for the endogenous variable that captures the school 
decision, the new model remedies the bias problem. 
 
II. Chilean Education System 
Since the establishment of Chile as a nation, widespread education has been a high 
priority for its government. Under colonial rule, the Catholic Church administered the 
education system and the availability of formal schooling was limited and directly related 
to wealth and socioeconomic status. The 1833 Constitution later consigned the government 
with responsibility of the education system. Schools and universities were managed by the 
state and had very low enrollment. President Gabriel Gonzáles Videla (1946-1952) initiated 
a program to improve educational outcomes through the provision of monetary subsidies 
that covered half of the tuition at some private schools. Subsequent administrations focused 
on expanding access to education and mandatory length of years of enrollment rather than 
improving educational quality. 
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Prior to 1980, the government defined curricula and supervised administration of more than 
80% of schools.4 Chile instituted an educational voucher system in the early 1980’s under 
Augusto Pinochet’s military regime. The vouchers consisted of a monetary subsidy that 
varied in value depending upon whether students were attending primary or secondary 
school. After families designated schools for their children, the schools received the 
subsidy directly. As part of this reform, control over school administration shifted from the 
central government to municipalities. Chile’s current education system consists of three 
types of schools that grew out of these reforms: public schools, subsidized private schools, 
and private schools. Generally, low-income families choose between public schools and 
subsidized private schools. Private schools draw students primarily from medium-high- and 
high-income families. 
 
III. Evaluation Measures 
Chile began using standardized tests in 1983 as a proxy to evaluate the performance 
of schools. Test results enable the government to assess school performance and provide 
families with important information on the quality of the schools available to them. Since 
the initial voucher reforms, the production function model has been the most common way 
to analyze school performance. This model uses standardized test results along with family 
and school characteristics to explain each individual’s achievement. 
Starting in 1987, the government began to administer the Measurement System of 
Quality of Education (SIMCE) annually to all fourth-, eighth-, and tenth-grade students. Its 
primary objective is to generate reliable indices that can guide policy to improve the quality 
of education, and give information to families about student performance both within and 
across schools. 
 
IV. Literature Review 
When looking at the available literature analyzing school success, the results of the 
voucher system are inconclusive. Educational voucher studies using OLS models suggest 
that the per-student subsidy increases student achievement, but its impact is small. Other 
                                                
4 (Nuñes 1993) 
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studies have focused on the role of alternative factors, such as parental education and 
school type, in determining educational outcomes.5 
A central shortcoming of OLS models is the selection bias produced by endogenous 
variables. School selection is an endogenous variable because it varies depending on family 
preference, resources, religious beliefs, and school availability thus, the OLS model, will be 
biased. This bias problem is addressed in Contreras (2001) and Contreras, Arzola and 
Bronfman (2001). Both studies identify school choice as an endogenous factor and use a 
supply-side instrument to model this decision. The instrument used is the accessibility of 
the three school types to the community. Using the 1998 academic achievement test (PAA) 
results, Contreras (2001) finds vouchers to have a significant and positive impact on 
student achievement. However, using the same methodology over the SIMCE dataset for 
1999, Contreras, Arzola and Bronfman (2001) do not find the same results. Their study 
finds that vouchers have a positive yet non-significant impact on educational outcomes and 
concludes that subsidized schools do not perform better than public schools. 
Rodríguez (1988) uses a sample of 281 schools located in Santiago and the results 
of the PER test, a standardized test used prior to SIMCE that measures results of the 
Chilean education system during 1984. The study concludes that the educational gap 
between schools is statistically significant by 7 to 8 points, favoring the private ones 
(Rodríguez 1988). Aedo and Larrañaga (1994) employ a broader dataset than Rodríguez, 
sampling 500 schools and using the 1990 and 1991 SIMCE dataset. This study also 
includes socioeconomic information from the National Socioeconomic Characteristics 
Survey (CASEN, 1990). Aedo and Larrañaga find similar evidence to Rodriguez: students 
at subsidized schools obtain higher average test scores than do public school students. 
Using a SIMCE panel data set for the years 1988 and 1996, Carnoy and McEwan (1998) 
analyzes the impact of voucher-induced competition on the Chilean education system, 
measuring the impact of competition based on the change in student distribution across 
different school types. This study finds that competition reduces the overall SIMCE test 
result. 
On average, these studies find a difference of roughly 7% in test scores across 
public, subsidized and private schools. However, these findings are not consistent when 
                                                
5  (Mizala & Romaguera 2000) 
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using different datasets and school levels, and the explanation for this difference changes 
when a greater number of control variables is included. Significant control variables 
include class size, teacher/student ratio, mother’s level of education, school revenue, 
poverty index, and a rate of failing years of school. All other studies relied on OLS models 
since there was no instrumental variable available to address the bias problem. 
 
V. Methodology 
Estimation of a standard OLS model will be presented and contrasted with results of 
the instrumental variable (IV) and two-stages least-square (TSLS) models. However, such 
estimation and modeling have limitations: some of the variables are correlated; and the 
dataset does not permit inclusion of some relevant variables that may help to better 
understand the task at hand. The TSLS model included in this paper is set up in the 
following way: In the first stage, an estimate of a Multinomial Logit model is used to 
predict the probability of choosing one of the three different schools types using the public 
schools as a reference. This model assumes that school selection is a function of family 
income, as well as some other restrictions such as availability of schools at the community 
level, and control variables. Availability is used as an instrument under the assumption that 
this variable is correlated with the decision of enrollment but not with student capacities. 
Therefore, this model addresses the bias problem by estimating a probability of enrollment 
that is not determined by the state of the other variables on the model.  
 
VI. Data and Analysis  
 This study uses the SIMCE test for the year 2003, administered on a national level 
to students in their second year of high school. Initially, an estimation of an OLS model 
will determine whether there is a selection bias when regressing the scores of both tests by 
the variables presented above. Results of the OLS are presented in the following table. 
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Table Nº1: SIMCE scores ordinary least-squares.  
  
Mathematics scores 
 
Language & Communication 
scores 
  
Family income (natural logarithm) 
12.23 7.82 
(58.43)** (45.27)** 
Books available in home 
5.43 5.08 
(49.71)** (54.55)** 
Father’s years of education  
1.31 1.14 
(33.06)** (33.42)** 
Mother’s years of education 
1.66 1.49 
(40.39)** (42.33)** 
Gender (female=1) 
-8.87 5.35 
(-37.30)** (26.24)** 
Subsidized school 
5.09 3.73 
(18.97)** (16.21)** 
Private school 
17.21 7.83 
(40.51)** (22.29)** 
Pre-school sducation (yes=1) 
-3.37 -0.77 
(-8.73)** (-2.24)** 
School failing proxy 
-29.26 -22.98 
(-103.76)** (-90.25)** 
Employment of householder 
(employed=1) 
-4.85 -2.64 
(-14.24)** (-8.89)** 
Selection process (yes=1) 
14.47 10.28 
(55.38)** (45.06)** 
Constant 
53.16 110.53 
(23.78)** (59.78)** 
Number of observations  177,491 177,493 
R2 0.312 0.27 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Source: SIMCE, 2003. 
 All coefficients estimated are statistically significant at 99% level of confidence. 
Both subsidized and private schools perform better than public schools on the math test 
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than on the language test. All other variables held constant, a student attending a subsidized 
school will score an average of three to five points higher than if he or she attended a pubic 
school.  
 A few other factors have a significant impact on student performance. For example, 
each additional year of paternal education increases students’ test scores by 1.3 and 1.1 
points in math and language, respectively. The employment status of the head of the 
household negatively affects scores by reducing the average test scores by an average of 
four points.   
 In addition, availability of books in the house adds more than five points to 
students’ test scores for each incremental increase in level of availability. Interesting but 
not surprising is that students who went through a selection process, such as an admission 
test, do better on this test. On average, they score 14.5 points higher on math and10.2 more 
on language. Students who have failed any level of school before taking the test are more 
likely to get an average of 30 points less on math and 23 lower on language.  
 The model and estimations presented above, as explained before, do not recognize 
or account for the presence of endogenous variables or the problem of school selection. 
This selection bias necessitates additional analysis.  
  The next step is to estimate a Multinomial Logit that predicts the probability of 
attending each type of school, using school availability at the community level as an 
instrument, and other variables such as family and school characteristics. This methodology 
prevents biased estimations by including endogenous variables. Results of this model are 
presented in the following table. 
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Table Nº 2: Predicted probabilities of attending each type of school, using a Multinomial 
Logit model.  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Probability of attending a public school 0.4625 0.2029 
Probability of attending a subsidized school 0.4051 0.1389 
Probability of attending a private school 0.1325 0.1712 
Instrument used: Availability at a community level; Number of observations: 179,678 
 
With the predicted probabilities as dependent variables, estimations of a TSLS model 
eradicate the endogenous bias caused by the non-random decision of attending variable. 
The fact that enrollment is a household non-random decision, biases any attempt of 
estimation. In this way, the probability (random by nature) estimated in the Logit model 
controls the bias. The following table presents the results of the TSLS model. 
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Table Nº 3: SIMCE scores using a two-stage least-square model.  
  
Mathematics scores 
 
Language & Communication 
scores 
  
Family income (natural logarithm) 
10.22 7.45 
(14.85)** (16.18)** 
Books available in home 
5.54 5.02 
(20.53)** (25.59)** 
Father’s years of education  
1.32 1.11 
(21.07)** (26.33)** 
Mother’s years of education 
1.69 1.47 
(25.42)** (28.26)** 
Gender (female=1) 
-8.69 5.38 
(-9.08)** (8.90)** 
Subsidized school 
-1.93 5.42 
(-0.46) (1.84) 
Private school 
27.16 10.45 
(6.39)** (3.68)** 
Pre-school education (yes=1) 
-2.79 -0.71 
(-3.85)** (-1.32) 
School failing proxy 
-29.78 -23.21 
(-34.79)** (-39.98)** 
Unemployment of householder 
(employed=1) 
-4.09 -2.57 
(-10.11)** (-7.93)** 
Selection process (yes=1) 
15.63 10.74 
(14.14)** (14.74)** 
Constant 
76.39 114.22 
(10.01)** (22.26)** 
Number of observations  177,491 177,493 
R2 0.31 0.27 
Source: SIMCE, 2003.  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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 The estimation presented above confirms the selection bias generated by an OLS 
model by comparing the impact of school choice on test scores as predicted by OLS and 
TSLS estimations. The TSLS model, using the probability predicted of attending one of the 
three types of school, shows new coefficients that explain the differences in results without 
the selection bias. The most remarkable change using the TSLS model is the private 
schools results. The estimated performance of private school students is ten points higher 
on math tests and three points higher on language tests than that of public school students.  
Thus, the OLS estimation underestimates the impact on test scores of attending to private 
schools.    
 In the OLS model, subsidized schools show better test score results than public 
schools. Controlling for school selection bias, using the TSLS model, subsidized schools do 
not show a statistically significant difference in student performance compared to public 
schools.  
VII. Results and Conclusion 
 Many studies have tried to identify the impact of the educational voucher system. 
This analysis finds similar results to its predecessors’ but maintains the accountability of 
the educational system and updates the dataset. Using a two-stages least-square model and 
estimating the differences between the results of the three school administrations co-
existing in Chile, private education emerged as superior, but subsidized and public schools 
came up with statistically equal results in both mathematics and language tests. 
Of the other variables included, income and parental education appear to be strong 
predictors of student performance. Gender also plays a role: girls perform worse in math 
but better in language than do boys, ceteris paribus. Availability of books in the house 
again proves important in determining better test scores. School selection processes 
increase the scores by 15.6 and 10.7 in math and language, respectively.  
 The results presented above are similar to the Contreras, Arzola and Bronfman 
(2001) findings. These results could suggest that the voucher system did not work as 
expected. The two school types that provide education to the poor and low-middle class 
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students performed the same regardless of their administration. The quality of education 
they provide is the same, and competition does not seem to improve results. Alternatively, 
one could argue that the competition level introduced to the system did work. The right 
incentive could equalize education, pooling its quality upward, and ultimately stabilize the 
education system at a level that uses its scarce resources most effectively. Both alternatives 
are plausible; however, the second seems more likely, since public schools have not 
performed as well as subsidized schools in recent years. Assuming that the voucher system 
does improve the quality of public and subsidized schools, there is still much to be done to 
improve the overall performance results of the Chilean education system. 
 In summary, the incentives and the level of competition introduced to the Chilean 
education system by vouchers, as well as the availability of both public and subsidized 
schools, at a community level, helps closing the gap of education quality among school 
types. Subsidized private schools and public schools increase competition for students, 
which allows the system to reach a higher steady state of quality that would not otherwise 
exist.  
 Regarding policy recommendations, a good idea is to look at outliers, subsidized, 
and public schools that are doing better than others, conduct internal evaluations to measure 
absolute progress, and try to duplicate their models of education. Since private education is 
substantially superior, more liberalization and a final privatization of schools may benefit 
the whole system. Privatizing the system and providing both a broader voucher system and 
direct subsidies to families can also improve competition. It would likely increase the 
quality of education by supplying a higher level of choice to low-income families, who 
currently cannot choose between subsidized and public schools, while also raising the 
quality of private education.  
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Annex 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4:  Mean and standard deviation of used variables. 
Variable Mean 
Mother’s education (years) 10.3 
(4.07) 
Father’s education (years) 10.8 
(4.35) 
Family income (natural Logarithm) 12.21 
(0.85) 
Books available (levels 0-6) 2.9 
(1.37) 
Gender (female=1 Male=0) 0.49 
(0.49) 
Dummy unemployed householder (employed=1) 0.78 
(0.41) 
Dummy failing level (failed once or more=1) 0.26 
(0.43) 
Dummy selection process (yes=1) 0.68 
(0.46) 
Dummy pre-school education (yes=1)  0.82 
(0.39) 
Math results for public schools 230.00 
(55.14) 
Language and Communication scores for public schools 241.42 
(47.98) 
Math results for subsidized schools 250.26 
(57.35) 
Language and Communication scores for subsidized schools 257.32 
(48.49) 
Math results for private schools 286.57 
(62.35) 
Language and Communication scores for private schools 279.73 
(49.09) 
Public Schools 0.46 
(0.49) 
Subsidized Schools 0.41 
(0.49) 
Private Schools 0.13 
(0.34) 
Number of observations: 241,796. Source: SIMCE, 2003 
